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The indirect argument (IA) for incompatibilism is based on the principle that an action to 
which there is no alternative is unfree, which we shall call ‘PA’.1 According to PA, to 
freely perform an action A, it must not be the case that one has ‘no choice’ but to perform 
A.  The libertarian and hard determinist advocates of PA must deny that free will would 
exist in a deterministic world, since no agent in such a world would perform an action to 
which there were alternatives: an action there being the necessary consequence of 
preceding events and the laws of nature, it would not be possible for a person to perform 
actions besides those he actually performs.  Determinism is seen here as “indirectly” 
ruling out free will by making the satisfaction of a necessary condition of free agency 
impossible, the former requiring, according to the leading proponent of libertarianism, 
Robert Kane, the performance of free actions.  To have a free will, on his view, is to have 
committed “self-forming” actions, that is, to have done things to which there were 
alternatives the doing of which led to the development of the desires, preferences, and 
beliefs that make up one’s character.2     
The range of phenomena obeying probabilistic laws has yet to be ascertained.  
Under certain assumptions, both STR and GTR entail an indeterministic mechanics.  But, 
contrary what is often claimed, quanta do not behave indeterministicly: the wave 
function/probabilistic laws being necessary only insofar as we wish to macroscopicly 
describe their behavior.
3
 It is far less clear, however, that the macro-events involved in 
human decision making and behavior, such as the releasing of neurotransmitters and the 
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contracting of muscles, occur indeterministically.
4
 The ontological status of these events- 
whether or not they are the necessary effects of prior occurrences- is, of course what 
matters in the free will debate.  For present purposes, however, this question will be put 
aside.  Instead, I will concentrate on buttressing the existing case against PA, aiming to 
show that even if deterministic laws hold at the level of macro-phenomena, free will 
remains a possibility.
5
 That is to say, I shall defend the thesis that so-called “Frankfurt 
cases” demonstrate that alternatives are not required to perform an action that is free in 
the sense of being something for which its agent is responsible.  
My defense will be carried out in three stages.  First, I must respond to those who 
maintain that a Frankfurt case is not a counterexample to PA because it is not an example 
of someone acting without alternatives.  Here, I confront the question of how “robust” an 
alternative must be in order to provide an agent with a way of avoiding praise or blame 
for the action that she actually commits. Secondly, I must show that an agent may be 
praiseworthy or blameworthy despite lacking alternatives at the time at which she acts, 
i.e., an appropriate object of one of a Strawsonian “reactive attitude” sans what I shall 
call “local” alternatives.6 At this point, I must attend to David Widerker’s recent critique 
of the use of Frankfurt cases as counterexamples to PA.
7
 Finally, I set for myself what I 
take to be the most difficult task of a compatibilist: demonstrating that not even an 
“historical” alternative- the possibility of having chosen a different path in life than the 
one that one has actually taken- is needed to have a free will.  In this connection, it will 
be incumbent upon me to explain why it would be fair to hold someone accountable for 
behavior issuing from a self she did not create, dispositions originating from natural 
conditions she did not establish.  That is to say, in denying that a free will entails the 
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ability to transcend oneself, I shall be faced with what Kane calls the “ultimacy” 
problem: how to explain away the incompatibilist’s intuition that it is senseless to adopt a 
reactive attitude towards someone incapable of self-transcendence, even if such a reaction 
is itself unavoidable.
8
 By showing that the desire for self-transcendence is itself irrational, 
I intend to solve this problem.  I will, thus, be left defending a version of compatibilism 
according to which a free will is to be understood as a healthy faculty- the will- being 
exercised in an environment conducive to self-realization, which is its purpose.  We 
begin by discussing 
Robust Local Alternatives 
 A Frankfurt case is supposed to provide an example of an agent who is 
responsible for some action to which there was no “local” alternative: a way to avoid 
performing the action that existed within the situation at hand.  That is, it is intended to 
show that an agent may be praiseworthy or blameworthy- an appropriate object of one of 
the Strawsonian “reactive attitudes”- for a certain action despite currently being unable to 
do otherwise.  A local alternative is to be contrasted with a “historical” one: something 
that could have been done prior to the situation at hand so that it would have had a 
different outcome.   The inevitability of a Frankfurt case’s outcome is a matter of a 
process unfolding unbeknownst to the agent, set in motion by someone desiring that 
outcome, that will force him to perform a particular action should he not decide to do it 
‘on his own’.  Here is a case in point. Debbie ardently desires an affair with her 
neighbor’s husband Phil.  To that end, she has had Phil’s neurologist surreptitiously 
install a mechanism in Phil’s brain that is set to compel him to approach Debbie, should 
he not decide to do so ‘on his own’ by midnight Friday.  It proves superfluous, however, 
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as Phil himself does intimate a liaison, calling Debbie at twelve o’clock Friday night.  
Assuming that Debbie’s ‘backup mechanism’ would have worked as intended, it seems 
that he had no choice but to initiate an affair.  Moreover, despite his inability to avoid 
becoming involved with Debbie, conducting the affair is something for which he appears 
blameworthy.  Certainly his wife, having discovered his unfaithfulness, would not 
absolve him, even were she apprised of Debbie’s device.  Defenders of PA, however, 
have challenged both of these claims.  
 Some maintain that a “Frankfurt agent” (FA) can be seen as having had more than 
one option depending on how we specify his action.
9
 Timothy O’ Connor, e.g., holds that 
an FA, although he cannot avoid performing a certain action, can avoid its voluntary 
performance.  The claim here is that an FA has more than a “flicker of freedom” in the 
form of a local alternative, viz., acting in a certain way involuntarily, rather than 
voluntarily.  Thus, if we hold an FA responsible, not simply for what he did, but for 
doing it ‘on his own’, we will not be holding him responsible for something to which 
there was no alternative, so that his case satisfies PA.  It would fail to satisfy PA only if 
we held him responsible for voluntarily or involuntarily performing his action, which was 
unavoidable.  In the above Frankfurt case, since Debbie has decided that she must have 
Phil by midnight on Friday, he has no choice but to begin an affair with her “one way or 
the other.”  But when he approaches her on Thursday afternoon, he is still able to ‘put 
off’ initiating the liaison ‘on his own’.  If his exercise of that option is that for which he is 
blameworthy, then it is not true that he is responsible for doing something to which there 
was no alternative: he could have involuntarily entered into the relationship instead.  
Thus, this case does not seem to count as a counterexample to PA. 
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 A “friend of Frankfurt cases” can respond here by pointing out that such a case 
would fail to be a counterexample to PA only if its agent not only had an alternative to 
what he did, but the possibility of doing something else entailing less blame or praise 
than his actual course of action, which would constitute a “robust” alternative on his 
part.
10
 It will not do for PA’s defenders to assert that an FA has other alternatives unless 
they are options he can be faulted or praised for not exercising.  A Frankfurt case is 
supposed to show that an agent, without having had any way of avoiding performing an 
action having a certain moral or practical value, can still be praiseworthy or blameworthy 
for what he did, having voluntarily committed his action.  If an FA cannot avoid doing 
something that is right/wrong or prudent/imprudent, he may yet be an appropriate 
candidate for one of the reactive attitudes provided that he acted ‘on his own’.  Frankfurt 
cases establish as much unless PA’s proponents point up morally or practically unequal 
options on the part of an FA.  That is to say, the version of PA that is under attack by the 
friends of Frankfurt cases is “robust” PA: 
  
 
(RPA) An agent is responsible (praiseworthy/blameworthy) for a given act only if 
he could also perform a morally or practically unequal act 
 
Were alternatives of this sort available to Phil?  His only other option entailed 
acting involuntarily.  Still, that may have been the morally preferable action, depending, I 
would argue, on why it would have been done.  The involuntariness of the act involved 
does not by itself make it insufficiently robust to satisfy RPA’s requirement, since there 
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may be circumstances in which acting on one’s own would not be morally/practically 
equivalent to acting involuntarily, given the “internal” reasons for doing one rather than 
the other.  E.g., if at the onset of a war I enlist in the service rather than be conscripted, so 
as to gain the satisfaction of having volunteered, then, depending on whether or not the 
cause for which I will be fighting is just, I will be more or less praiseworthy than I would 
have been as a conscript.  Thus, the answer to the question of whether or not Phil should 
be faulted for not acting involuntarily depends, I would maintain, on what he knew and 
what he intended.   
There are several possibilities to consider.  First, supposing that he was aware of 
Debbie’s plans and his susceptibility to her charms and wanted to do the seducing 
himself, his unfaithfulness seems more reproachable than it would have been had he 
simply allowed it to occur, revealing as it does a lack of compunction.  On the other hand, 
there is something to be said, as Luther maintained, for sinning wholeheartedly.  
Fortunately, we do not have to settle this issue, since it is of the essence of an FA that he 
not be aware that he is about to do something involuntarily should he not decide to do it 
on his own.  What should we say, then, of Phil who is ignorant of Debbie’s plans?  
Should we fault him for not doing that which would have caused him to act involuntarily, 
viz., delaying taking his decision until sometime after midnight Friday, an option, for all 
he knew, that existed?  Not unless we have reason to believe that he also knew that 
exercising it would have led to forbearance sans her interference- that waiting would 
have done some good.  If he had merely been struggling with qualms that he would have 
eventually set aside, ‘working up the nerve’, so to speak, then his conduct would have 
been no less contemptible than that in which he actually engaged.  What is important here 
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is the reason for a delay.  It would redound to his credit only if it had been caused by an 
attempt to avoid wrongdoing.  
A friend of Frankfurt cases, thus, emerges from the debate over robust alternatives 
having to make a small concession to her opponent.  To wit, she must stipulate that an FA 
is justifiably unaware of the option of exercising restraint until the counterfactual 
intervener’s deadline has passed, otherwise there would be a local robust alternative to 
the action he can perform voluntarily: viz., allowing his desire to perform that action to 
dissipate, so that he would be performing involuntarily an action that he would have 
refrained from had he been ‘left alone’.  Obviously, our Frankfurt case can be revised so 
as to meet this requirement.  We just need to imagine that Phil is under the perhaps 
mistaken but justifiable impression that his passion for Debbie will not cool any time in 
the foreseeable future, so that any delay on his part would be caused simply by 
apprehensiveness.  He would, thus, be left with no local robust alternative to having an 
affair: either he will give in to his desire and initiate the liaison himself or the backup 
mechanism will force him into an affair.  For him, the option of doing something less 
reprehensible than deliberating violating his marriage vows, viz., involuntarily being 
unfaithful for having tried to ‘outlast’ the temptation to have an affair, will not be one 
that he should be faulted for not exercising, since it will not be amongst his “epistemic” 
possibilities.  An FA meeting this requirement we will refer to as an ‘FA*’. 
It could be countered here that even an FA* has a local robust alternative.  It 
would have been morally preferable, someone might maintain, for Phil to have been 
involuntarily unfaithful for having been unable to overcome his compunctions before 
Debbie’s deadline- even if he was just about to do it ‘on his own’.11 It makes no 
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difference  whether or not he was on the verge of starting the affair, he would still have 
been less reproachable than he actually is, having not only contemplated being unfaithful, 
but also decided to set aside whatever qualms he had had about breaking his marriage 
vows.  For the purpose of judging morally, the only relevant fact is whether or not 
wrongdoing occurred; the reasons why something was or was not done should not matter 
here.  
This move, however, entails that a person’s moral luck should not be disregarded 
in evaluating his conduct.  The only difference here between actual philandering Phil and 
counterfactual philandering Phil is temporal: the latter is still in the process of ‘making up 
his mind’ when Debbie intervenes- an action over which he has no control.  Had she not 
intervened, he would have done the very same thing as actual Phil, only later.  Let us 
suppose that counterfactual Phil would have ‘made his move’ at 12:01 p.m. that night.  
Thus, by meeting her deadline, actual Phil has, according to the position being here 
entertained, made himself more blameworthy than he would have been had he hesitated 
for another minute.  With this view in mind, we can imagine him saying to himself, upon 
discovering what Debbie had been up to, ‘if I had waited just a little longer I wouldn’t 
have become as bad a person as I am now’.  Or to look at things from counterfactual 
Phil’s perspective, it was his good fortune that Debbie intervened when she did, 
otherwise he would have been actual Phil’s moral equal.  As things stand, in virtue of 
nothing he did, he is less blameworthy.  Debbie’s intervention accounts for that moral 
fact.   
It appears, then, that treating an FA* as having a robust alternative leads to the 
conundrum that has vexed philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams: it 
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seems unfair that a person’s moral standing in relation to others should depend upon 
factors over which she lacks control and, yet, that is precisely what is entailed by many of 
our moral judgments.
12
 By treating an FA* as lacking a robust alternative, we sidestep 
this issue here: Phil could not have made himself less blameworthy by delaying his 
decision unless it was going to issue in the resolution to remain faithful.  Debbie’s 
intervention alone would not alter his moral status.
13
 
O’ Connor’s specification move, thus, fails to clearly demonstrate the existence of 
alternatives on the part of an FA*.  Ginet maintains, however, that this move does not 
exhaust the conceptual resources available to the incompatibilist.  There are other ways of 
qualifying judgments of responsibility, which, when combined with an incompatibilist 
friendly revamping of the parameters of a Frankfurt case, entail robust alternatives on the 
part of an FA*.  By Ginet’s lights, an FA* (and any agent) should be held responsible for 
having acting precisely when he did, and not for having acted at any less specific time.
14
  
Moreover, according to him, to avoid begging the question against the incompatibilist, 
the friend of Frankfurt cases must place the deadline for the voluntary performance of the 
desired act beyond the time at which it is actually performed.  If this “time-shift move” is 
not made, if the actual and counterfactual actions are taken to have the same time of 
occurrence, then the process that would have led to the involuntary performance of the 
act would have failed to achieve that result only because the monitoring of the FA*’s 
neural processes revealed a sufficient condition for its voluntary performance, in which 
case the incompatibilist will claim that it was not a free act, being determined.
15
   
I do not think that a Frankfurt case must be set up in this way to avoid begging the 
question against the incompatibilist: determinism sans PA does not preclude free will and 
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it is PA’s fate that ‘hangs in the balance’.  But, at this juncture, I will not press this point.  
Instead, I will adjust the parameters of my Frankfurt case in the way Ginet prescribes and 
see whether or not it entails robust alternatives on the part of an FA*.  Thus, let us 
stipulate that Phil made his overture at 11:59 p.m. on Friday and that it is that for which 
he is blameworthy. 
The problem with Ginet’s proposal is that it makes responsibility temporally 
relative.  It allows for the possibility of someone being responsible for doing something 
at a certain time without deserving to be held accountable for its being done simpliciter.
16
 
In our example, although Phil would be responsible for being unfaithful at 11:59 p.m. on 
Friday, which was not inevitable, it would wrong to hold him accountable for being 
unfaithful, since that is not something he could have avoided doing, thus preserving PA.  
Thus, if we equate being an appropriate candidate for one of the reactive attitudes with 
being responsible, Phil’s wife would be justified in being indignant with Phil for being 
unfaithful at 11:59 p.m. Friday, but not in feeling resentful towards him for being 
unfaithful.  If the affair came to light, however, one could imagine that such hair-splitting 
on the part of Phil, suggesting that its inevitability mitigates his guilt for engaging in it at 
any time at all, would not change the way his wife feels.  ‘You betrayed me period!’ she 
would respond.  Thus, Ginet’s proposal fails to track the way in which the reactive 
attitudes are actually held. 
Ginet responds to this criticism with a putative counterexample to the principle in 
question: if an agent is  responsible for an act being committed/consequence occurring at 
t, then he is responsible for that act being committed/consequence occurring at any time 
including t.  Booth, he says, was responsible for Lincoln dying on 18 April 1865, but not 
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for Lincoln dying sometime before 1920 (when he would have been 111 years old).
17
 It 
must be asked, however, why shouldn’t we hold Booth accountable for the fact that 
Lincoln died sometime before 1920?  Admittedly, it is not a fact that would interest an 
historian, whose concern is with contingencies.  That it was going to obtain regardless of 
what Booth did may tempt us to say that it is something for which no one is responsible.  
We must resist this temptation, however, as giving in to it would, in the present context, 
amount to question begging, since the issue at hand is whether or not inevitability entails 
lack of moral responsibility: the Booth case is part of a defense of PA.  Thus, the question 
becomes: are we dealing here with just another Frankfurt case?  If we are, then we may 
adjudicate it in the same manner as we treated the case of Phil, which shows that 
inevitability does not preclude moral responsibility.  If it is not, then it is irrelevant to our 
present concern: determining whether or not an FA* should be held accountable for what 
is inevitable.  That is to say, if Booth turns out not to be responsible for Lincoln’s death 
simpliciter, but is not an FA*, then his case cannot serve the purpose of defending PA 
against the use of a Frankfurt counterexample.  The friends of Frankfurt cases will 
concede Ginet’s point about the required specificity of moral judgement vis-à-vis the 
Booth case, but insist that an FA* should be held accountable for that which is inevitable, 
viz., the less specific action entailed by the temporally indexed action he commits. 
It is obvious that Booth was not an FA*, having been aware of Lincoln’s 
mortality.  The reason that he is not responsible for the (inevitable) fact entailed by the 
more specific (contingent) fact for which Ginet does hold him accountable is that he 
willed that the latter obtain rather than the former, not because its obtaining was 
inevitable.
18
 An FA*, however, is not cognitively in a position to make such a choice: 
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Phil, in our example, does not reject making the less specific fact of being unfaithful at 
some time or other obtain in order to have an affair at a definite time.  He simply decides 
to initiate a liaison.  Thus, the reason that Booth, who is knowledgeable in the way that 
Phil would have been had he been aware of Debbie’s intentions, is not responsible for 
what is inevitable does not apply to an FA*.   
There does not, then, appear to be a non-question begging way of demonstrating 
that responsibility is temporally relative that would help in explaining away the intuition 
that an FA* should be held accountable for performing an unavoidable act.  It will not do 
to attribute this judgment to the failure to temporally specify that for which an FA* is 
responsible.  Even having shifted an FA*’s action backwards in time, so that its 
counterfactual involuntary performance and actual voluntary performance are temporally 
separated, the friend of Frankfurt cases can still maintain that an FA* is responsible for 
what is inevitable- his performance of that action at some time or other- given his 
responsibility for what is not unavoidable- his performance of that action before it would 
have been done involuntarily.  The Booth case is a counterexample to the principle ‘Any 
agent who is responsible for the obtaining of F at t is also responsible for the obtaining of 
A at some time or other’ but not the narrower principle ‘Any agent, who does not 
specifically intend that F obtain at t rather than at some time or other, but who 
(nonetheless) is responsible for F obtaining at t, is also responsible for F obtaining at 
some time or other’.  The obtaining of the fact that an FA* performed a certain action at 
some time or other is covered by the latter principle.  Thus, that for which he seems 
responsible is inevitable. 
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Responsibility and Voluntary Action 
Is there any way, however, for the compatibilist to justify his intuition that an FA* 
is responsible for his unavoidable action?  So far, we have only shown that his action was 
indeed unavoidable and that it still seems to be something for which he is responsible, 
despite its inevitability, given that he did it ‘on his own’.  But, given that an FA* lacked 
robust local alternatives, what reason is there for holding him accountable for his action?  
What does it mean to say that he has acted ‘on his own’ so as to become responsible for 
his action?  To correctly answer this question, I believe that we must specify the aspects 
of his situation left unaffected by the process that was leading to his deed’s involuntary 
performance.  We must ask ourselves, what could he still do, by way of determining his 
situation’s outcome, despite his act’s unavoidability?  As noted above, he was yet capable 
of voluntarily ‘bringing it about’, which is precisely how he did it: his unfaithfulness was 
a function of his volition.  Nothing that Debbie did interfered with Phil’s deliberations, 
the outcome of which was the intention to begin an affair.  The execution of this intention 
was also completely controlled by Phil; he was neither aided nor abetted by Debbie.  In a 
word, the process that was leading to involuntary unfaithfulness left Phil with a free will, 
in the sense of a faculty/neural network allowing him to exercise that option ‘on his own’.  
That his unfaithfulness was a function of his volition- that he motivated himself to have 
an affair by ‘giving in’ to the desire to do so, I would contend, is wherein his 
responsibility for having an affair lies.  In other words, his performance of a series of 
mental acts constituting a free exercise of his will is what makes him responsible for the 
ensuing conduct: the former “confers” responsibility upon the latter.   
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Contra O’Connor’, who would contend that Phil is responsible for the avoidable 
act of willingly having an affair, this view has it that Phil is responsible for having an 
affair simpliciter, which is unavoidable, for willing to have an affair. Of course, this 
move begs the question, why would he be responsible for that mental act, if it was 
unavoidable?  To posit previous voluntary acts as the source of responsibility would seem 
to lead to a vicious regress unless sense can be made of an actual infinite regress of such 
acts.  That would be one way of avoiding the conclusion drawn by Robert Kane at this 
point: that free will entails the performance of acts the responsibility for which stems 
from the performance of those acts themselves, not other acts.
19
 The other alternative 
would be to show that having a free will does not require being the ultimate source of 
one’s character- the libertarian ideal- since the idea of a person forming herself 
independently of natural forces is incoherent. Defending one of these positions, however, 
would require going beyond the issue at hand: does free will require the existence of 
local, robust alternatives?  Here we can answer in the negative.  An FA*, whose intention 
forming and executing faculties were exercised parallel to the process leading to the 
involuntary performance of his act, rendering it causally superfluous, is an appropriate 
candidate for one of the reactive attitudes.  While it may be inconceivable that an agent 
be praiseworthy/blameworthy for performing an act having never been able to do 
something to avoid it, Frankfurt cases show that at the time of acting one can be without 
alternatives yet still be responsible for what is done, given the fact that it is the outcome 
of the unimpeded exercise of one’s will, not of the exertions of someone or something 
else. 
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Implicit here is the notion that, since an explanation of an FA*’s action need not 
reference the fact that it was unavoidable, this fact should be disregarded in determining 
whether or not he should be held accountable for its performance.
20
 We should focus 
instead on the actual sequence of events leading up to the action’s performance, 
specifically, its proximate causes.  Widerker maintains that this Frankfurtian principle of 
moral judgment is untrue: that there are cases in which it is appropriate to take into 
account factors besides those in terms of which an act can be explained in order to 
determine whether or not it is something for which its agent is responsible.
21
 The first 
case that he cites as a counterexample was proposed to him by Ginet: superstitious Smith 
declined to perform the ritual that he mistakenly believed would have diverted a deadly 
storm’s path, sending it out to sea.22  Should he be thought of as negligent, that is, blamed 
for not preventing the damage caused by the storm (not simply for not doing something 
to prevent the damage caused by the storm, for which, Widerker concedes, he is 
blameworthy)?  If we apply the above principle, the answer appears to be ‘yes’, since it 
requires us to overlook the exculpatory fact that the storm was beyond his control.  His 
desire to witness buildings being destroyed (we will suppose) explains his refusal to 
perform the ritual, not a realization of his powerlessness.  But this principle is not meant 
to apply to cases of putative negligence, since they require us to consider not merely what 
an agent has done or not done, but also the consequences of his deed or omission, what 
he has accomplished or failed to accomplish.  That factors beyond an agent’s control may 
contribute to the success or failure of his project, as Kant noted in arguing against 
Consequentialism, warrants counterfactual speculation in determining the degree to 
which its agent is responsible for the realization of/failure to realize its goal.
23
 In this 
 16 
context, questions such as ‘What would have happened had he acted/not acted/ acted 
differently?’ are indeed appropriate: we must subtract in thought his action in order to 
determine the extent to which he influenced his situation’s outcome.  That is to say, here 
we must look beyond the reasons why an action was committed because they are only a 
subset of the reasons for the occurrence of that which must be explained in order to 
assign responsibility.  Where we are only concerned with morally assessing what an 
agent has done or not done, on the other hand, disregarding all but what actually 
transpired prior to his act or omission seems warranted.  Otherwise, we risk losing sight 
of his role in determining what happened, the reason, if there is one, for him being 
responsible for its occurrence. 
Widerker offers his own counterexample to Frankfurt’s principle linking 
explanation and responsibility, one that does not involve a judgement of responsibility for 
the consequences of an action or omission.
24
 Here, lazy Green decides to stay in bed 
instead of reporting to work, shortly thereafter realizing that he is not feeling well 
anyway.  Although his sickness had nothing to do with him missing work, Widerker 
maintains that it justifies his absence.
25
 Following Ginet, he, thus, draws a distinction 
between having an “explanatory” and having a “justificationary” excuse for an action: the 
former, but not the latter, must be amongst the reasons for its performance.
26
 In the 
context at hand, however, this distinction appears to involve question begging, since the 
justificationary excuses offered- the inevitability of the storm’s damage and the (near) 
unavoidability of staying home from work- are legitimate only if one assumes that 
unavoidability entails lack of responsibility, which is what the friends of Frankfurt cases 
deny.  Moreover, it is not clear that Green’s sickness is not amongst his reasons for 
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staying home, though the fact of it did not enter into the deliberations from which his 
decision to stay home issued.  That he did not feel well explains why he could not go to 
work; though it does not explain why he decided not to go to work.  His sickness affords 
him merely a “convenient” excuse for being absent.  Thus, this case is not a 
counterexample to the principle that all legitimate excuses are explanatory excuses.   
Widerker, however, believes that the case of someone knowingly doing wrong for 
selfish reasons does undercut the broader claim that there is a conceptual link between 
explanation and responsibility.
27
 For here our judgment of blameworthiness is based upon 
the fact that the agent in question disregarded his moral beliefs, which, Widerker claims, 
does not explain his action- as it can be accounted for by his selfishness.  The first thing 
to be said in response is that such a case does not refute the claim that all legitimate 
excuses are explanatory excuses, since it presents us with an inexcusable act.  Thus, since 
the judgment of blameworthiness in Frankfurt cases is based on this narrower claim 
(rather than the broader assertion that all non-explanatory facts are morally irrelevant) the 
purported upshot of Widerker’s case- that the reasons for blaming an agent may 
transcend his motives- does not render its premise false.  Moreover, it is not clear that the 
fact on which our condemnation is based in this case- that its agent knowingly did wrong- 
is not part of the explanation for the act in question, albeit in another guise.  For to 
knowingly do wrong, as just noted, is to disregard the claims of morality in deciding how 
to act.  If this analysis is correct, then the verdict we reach in Widerker’s case is based on 
its agent motive: the unscrupulousness that makes his act intelligible.  His selfishness 
alone cannot explain his act, since it is consistent with him doing the right thing.  Without 
having contempt for morality, he would not have been able to overcome the resistance 
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supplied by his conscience.  This attitude, then, must be considered part of his motive.  
Thus, Widerker’s case of unscrupulous conduct, upon closer inspection, appears to 
accord with Frankfurt’s principle linking explanation and responsibility.  None of the 
cases he proffers, therefore, refute the basis of belief that an FA* is responsible.       
Widerker’s next poses a direct challenge to this belief.  Instead of attempting to 
refute the specific principle on which it is based, Widerker argues that it is indefensible, 
given that it raises a question to which there is no adequate answer, viz., what should an 
FA* have done instead?  Unless the friend of Frankfurt cases can provide an answer here, 
Widerker contends that it would be unreasonable for him to hold an FA* responsible.
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That is to say, we should not blame someone like Phil for what he did, since we could not 
have reasonably expected him to do otherwise.  This “W-defense,” according to 
Widerker, provides a “good reason for holding PA,” for refusing to hold an FA* 
accountable based on the inevitability of his action.
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There is question begging going on here, however. It is true that an FA*, as 
shown above, had no robust local alternative to his action.  The only question was, would 
he perform it voluntarily or involuntarily?  Thus, friends of Frankfurt cases must concede 
‘up front’ that an FA* could not have been reasonably expected to avoid performing his 
action.  In other words, the W-defense invokes a principle entailing PA, which is what 
Frankfurt cases are designed to refute: you ought to be held responsible only if you could 
have been reasonably expected to do otherwise only if alternatives are requirement of 
moral responsibility.  Such a move is, thus, dialecticly inappropriate.  The friend of 
Frankfurt cases, having rejected PA, would not accept Widerker’s expectation principle.  
Moreover, there is an answer to the question that forms the basis of the W-defense.  Even 
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though an FA*’s action was unavoidable, there is still an answer to the question what 
should he have done instead?  An FA* who has done something blameworthy should 
have avoided developing a character trait that would manifest itself in wrongdoing.  
Widerker denies that an FA* of this sort has necessarily failed to meet such an obligation, 
assuming that “he is a morally conscientious agent.”30 However, this assumption is belied 
by his behavior.  A morally conscientious agent would not break a promise to his uncle, 
which what Widerker’s FA* does, or cheat on his wife, as Phil does.  Thus, the W-
defense fails to support PA. 
Modified Frankfurt Cases 
Let us now consider other attempts by friends of Frankfurt cases to avoid Ginet’s 
charge of question begging.  Here we are conceding that there cannot be a sufficient 
condition for an FA*’s action, otherwise it is not something for which he is responsible.  
Does that imply that it was avoidable?  Rather than make Ginet’s time-shift move, Al 
Mele and David Robb stipulate that an FA*’s action was produced by an indeterministic 
process that unfolded cotemporaneously with a deterministic process that would have 
culminated, at the same time as the indeterministic process did, in its involuntary 
performance had it not been done voluntarily.
31
 (The case they give is of a Bob who 
decides to steal the car of an Ann.  The deterministic process is neuronal and had been 
initiated by a man named Black whose goal was to have Bob make that decision.)  Their 
approach, thus, does not generate the time-indexed alternative to committing that action 
simpliciter: without a temporal distance between his actual and counterfactual actions, it 
is not true that he could have avoided performing his action at its actual time of 
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performance.  Mele and Robb, thus, are able to sidestep the issue of whether or not 
judgements of responsibility should be temporally relativized.  
The problem with this approach, according to Widerker, is that makes it difficult, 
if not impossible, to understand how the process leading to the involuntary performance 
of an FA*’s action is preempted without its becoming avoidable.32 For once that process 
is ‘shut down’, the possibility of not performing it seems to be created: it is no longer the 
case that if the FA* does not do it ‘on his own’ there is a process unfolding that will 
culminate in him doing it against his will.  If that process cannot be preempted, then the 
performance will be overdetermined, or at least it will unclear as to what caused it to 
occur, casting doubt upon the claim that it is something for which the FA* is responsible.  
Thus, Mele and Robb seem to be faced with a dilemma: either the involuntary 
performance process of a Frankfurt case is preempted, in which case an FA*’s action 
seems avoidable, or it is not, in which case his action is not clearly one for which he 
ought to be held accountable.  In neither event would PA be violated. 
By making Ginet’s time-shift move, however, Mele and Robb could solve this 
dilemma, as it would make its first horn false.  Since they have stipulated that an FA*’s 
action is indeterministically caused, they are left, as Ginet noted, with the action itself as 
the only possible preemptor of the process leading to its involuntary performance.  In the 
end, they are, thus, required to modify their example ala Ginet so that its agent would 
have acted involuntarily at a time subsequent to the time at which he performed his action 
‘on his own’, which could then be taken as what forestalled its involuntary performance.  
Of course, having made this modification, they are no longer able to sidestep the issue of 
whether or not judgements of responsibility should be temporally relativized.  We have 
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just seen, however, that a compatibilist can rebut Ginet’s suggestion that an FA* should 
only be held accountable for that to which there is a robust local alternative, viz., acting 
in a certain way at a specific time. 
Another purported example of an FA* is provided by Eleonore Stump.
33
 In her 
Frankfurt case, an elector’s neural process D, whose initial stages are the spiking of 
neurons x, y, and z, is correlated with the decision to vote a Democratic ticket while 
another neural process R, whose initial stages are the spiking of neurons a, b, and c, is 
correlated with the decision to vote Republican a ticket.  Neither sequence of events 
would be causally determined.  The voter’s neural processes are being monitored by a 
device designed to cause process R to occur by 7 p.m. on Election Day (which has been 
surreptitiously installed in his brain by a over-enthusiastic Republican neurosurgeon 
while he was performing an exploratory procedure).  To that end, should it detect the 
spiking of x, y, and z, it will terminate D and initiate R.  On the other hand, if it senses 
that a, b, and c have spiked, then it will not interfere with the working of the elector’s 
brain.  As it happens, R occurs sometime on Election Day, at that time the voter decides 
on the Republican ticket.  The preemptor in this scenario is, thus, not the action itself, as 
in Ginet’s case or the modified Mele/Robb example, but only one of its temporal parts: its 
initial phase.  (We will assume here that it makes sense to treat the taking of a decision as 
temporally extended, which, as Widerker notes, is at least phenomenologically suspect.
34
)  
Still, ceteris paribus, there must be at least a short temporal distance between what is 
actually done and what would occur counterfactually to allow for the spiking of x, y, and 
z, which did not actually take place.  Thus, Stump’s example, like Mele and Robb’s, will 
count as a counterexample to PA only if Ginet is incorrect in temporally qualifying 
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judgments of responsibility.   (Indeed, Widerker denies that the voter in Stump’s case 
lacks a robust local alternative based on the assumption that “it is (deciding at t to vote 
for a Republican candidate) for which he is held responsible.”35) There are reasons, as we 
have seen, for rejecting this move. 
The Frankfurt cases that we have considered so far are labeled “no prior sign” 
scenarios by Derk Pereboom.
36
 This designation reflects the fact that in these cases 
Ginet’s question begging charge is avoided by having intervention preempted by the 
observation of the performance of the desired act prior to a deadline, rather than the 
detection of an antecedently occurring sufficient condition.  Pereboom himself, however, 
favors another response to Ginet’s objection.  His Frankfurt case features a device that 
will induce the performance of a certain action should it detect a necessary condition for 
its non-performance: a reason not to do it ‘coming to mind’.37 As it happens, the action in 
question is performed- the FA* claims an income tax deduction to which he is not 
entitled- but as the result of an indeterministic process.  There appears to be no reason, 
then, for an incompatibilist not to hold the FA* here responsible, although he seemed to 
lack a robust local alternative.  Since he failed to think of a reason to not claim the 
deduction, he had to cheat on his taxes; on the other hand, had should such a reason 
suggested itself, he would still have cheated on his income taxes, albeit involuntarily.  To 
be sure, he could have brought a reason not to cheat on his income taxes to mind.  But, in 
itself, according to Pereboom, that would not have been doing “something to avoid (his) 
blameworthiness,” since it consistent with the blameworthy course of action that he 
actually took.
38
 On his reading of PA, to have a robust local alternative, it is not enough 
to be able to improve one’s chances of not becoming blameworthy; one must be able to 
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definitely escape blame.  We need to ask ourselves, though, how we would have 
appraised this agent had he managed to think of a reason to be honest in making out his 
tax forms.  Would we not have thought ‘more of him’ had he shown some scruples there, 
even if they would have been overcome sans interference?  After all, we might be 
tempted under those circumstances to absolve him of blame because, for all we would 
know, he would have avoided acting dishonestly, that is, decided to follow his conscience 
(an option that the device, but not necessarily he, would have foreclosed).  It is said that 
“the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”  Still, an agent who is at least concerned 
with morality seems closer to salvation than someone who ‘never gives it a second 
thought’: a scrupulous but akratic individual appears morally superior to an unscrupulous 
character.  The reading of PA that I proposed above has it that by exercising a robust 
local option an agent would have attained a different moral status than the one he has 
actually achieved.  Despite being unable to definitely avoid blameworthiness by 
exercising his other option, the agent in Pereboom’s example could have done something 
to lessen his guilt: made a greater effort at ‘doing the right thing’.  As things stand, we 
can say of him that he did not try as hard as he could have to act morally.  (His case 
should be contrasted with the situation of Phil the FA*: in the former but not the latter 
there exists the epistemic possibility of acting wrongly for having made at least a brief 
attempt at doing the ‘right thing’.)  Thus, it is not clear that making the prior sign in a 
Frankfurt case a necessary rather than a sufficient condition yields a counterexample to 
PA, as the incompatibilist can challenge the claim that it eliminates all robust local 
alternatives. 
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David Hunt provides another example of a Frankfurt case in which an action is 
unavoidable but not for being causally determined.  Here the notion of divine 
omniscience is appealed to: if God knew in advance that an act would be performed, then 
it was unavoidable; at the time of its performance there would have been nothing else that 
its agent could have done, other wise God could not have been certain that it would be 
committed.
39
 God, it is assumed, could possess such foreknowledge even in regards to a 
world in which only probabilistic laws obtained.  Putting aside the question of how God 
could have known in advance that a given event was going to occur sans knowing that a 
sufficient condition for its occurrence would occur- an undetermined event would 
seemingly have been unpredictable- there are specifically libertarian objections to this 
approach to Frankfurt case construction.  As Widerker points out, it raises the same 
concern as prior sign Frankfurt cases: if God’s foreknowledge necessitates the 
performance of a given act, then its agent does not meet the libertarian standard of free 
agency.
40
 Having refused to accept the compatibilist’s claim that the agents of some 
causally necessitated actions act ‘on their own’, the libertarian would be disinclined to 
treat any metaphysically necessitated doings as free actions. 
Frankfurt Cases and Question Begging 
We must now address the Ginet/Widerker charge of question begging in the 
construction of Frankfurt cases.  Must one modify the original Frankfurt scenario in one 
of the foregoing ways for it to be dialecticly appropriate, removing a sufficient condition 
for the action performed?  In the context of defending IA, the incompatibilist is not 





1. If all acts are determined, then no acts are avoidable. 
2. If no acts are avoidable, then no acts are free (PA). 
3. Thus, if all acts are determined, then no acts are free. 
Frankfurt cases are given as counterexamples to 2.  In maintaining that the actions 
involved are unfree unless they are undetermined, Widerker and Ginet are appealing to 
the conclusion of the very argument whose soundness is at issue!  Thus, unless they have 
independent support for that proposition they are begging the question against the friend 
of Frankfurt cases.  Such support exists, of course, in the form of the aforementioned 
“direct argument” for incompatibilism.  Should they appeal to it, however, they would 
render PA and, thus, IA superfluous.  
The salient aspect of Frankfurt cases, for the purpose of judgments of 
responsibility, is that the act involved is performed voluntarily.  By focusing exclusively 
on the issue of determinism, Ginet and Widerker miss this point or, at least, downplay its 
significance.  Ginet asks, if we do not believe that an FA* would have been responsible 
had his action been necessitated by the “backup mechanism,” why should we think of 
him as actually responsible, given that there was a sufficient condition for his action?
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But we would have declined to hold an FA* responsible had the backup mechanism 
operated, not because his action would have been necessitated, but because he would 
have lacked control over its performance.   
Likewise, Widerker claims that “the circumstances that make it impossible (for an 
FA) to avoid performing (his action) … bring it about” if it is “causally determined.”43  A 
Frankfurt case, however, is supposed to be an “intuition pump” regarding the connection 
between avoidability and free will.  Determinism seems to threaten our belief in free will 
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only because it would render our actions unavoidable.  A Frankfurt case is meant to 
challenge this intuition, presenting a situation in which an agent seems responsible for his 
conduct even though it was unavoidable for reasons beyond its being causally 
determined: if unavoidability per se does not entail lack of responsibility, then the 
inevitability of our actions for their being causally determined leaves open the possibility 
of an agent having a free will.  Thus, in assessing a Frankfurt case, the issue of 
determinism must be “bracketed.”  The phrase ‘the circumstances that made it impossible 
(for an FA) to avoid performing (his) action (but which) in no way bring it about’ should 
not be taken to refer to its actual cause but to the backup mechanism, which, in allowing 
it to be performed voluntarily, gives an FA the chance to be responsible for its 
performance.  Read in this way, a Frankfurt case is a counterexample to PA even if an 
FA’s action was causally determined, since at least one thing that made it unavoidable is 
not responsible for its performance; its agent is to be praised/blamed in virtue of having 
done it ‘on his own’ (more precisely in virtue of having freely performed each one of the 
series of actions bringing about its performance). 
In sum, there are two strategies an incompatibilist can employ to rebut the claim 
that Frankfurt cases refute PA.  He can either argue that an FA has a robust local 
alternative or show that he is not responsible for his action.  If he takes the latter tack, he 
will wind up either begging the question against the friend of Frankfurt cases or obviating 
the need to defend PA.  I have shown that the former approach will not work either, as a 
Frankfurt case can be reformulated so that the only alternative to performing the act in 
question voluntarily is not robust enough to ground an ascription of responsibility.  The 
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failure to exercise that option is not what makes an FA* responsible.  Rather, it is because 
he acted ‘in character’, having freely exercised his will.  
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